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PANEL DISCUSSION
Copenhagen (COP-15) Roundtable

*

NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, JAMES VAN NOSTRAND,
RICHARD L. OTTINGER, ANDREW C. REVKIN,
CALEB CHRISTOPHER, JOANNE KALAS, SHAKEEL KAZMI
**
& SALEEM ALI
Megan Marshall: Hello everyone. Thank you for coming.
My name is Megan Marshall and I am the Colloquium Editor for
Pace Environmental Law Review and we are very excited about
this event. I would like to introduce Professor Nicholas Robinson
who is going to introduce our panel and give some opening
remarks about his new climate change book. Thank you,
Professor Robinson.

*

On January 26, 2010, Pace Environmental Law Review, in conjunction
with the Pace Academy for Applied Environmental Studies, the Center for
Environmental Legal Studies, and the Pace Energy and Climate Center held a
roundtable discussion regarding the aftermath of the COP-15 Climate
Conference. At this event, Nicholas A. Robinson provided the opening remarks
and James Van Nostrand was the roundtable moderator. This transcript has
been edited for clarity and grammar.
**
Nicholas A. Robinson is the Pace University Professor on the Environment
and the Gilbert and Sarah Kerlin Distinguished Professor of Environmental
Law. James Van Nostrand is the Executive Director of the Pace Energy and
Climate Center and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Pace. Richard L. Ottinger,
former U.S. Congressman, is Dean Emeritus of Pace Law School and was a
COP15 delegate for the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
(IUCN). Andrew C. Revkin, Dot Earth Blogger for the New York Times is also
the Senior Fellow for Environmental Understanding at Pace University’s
Academy for Applied Environmental Studies. Caleb Christopher is the Legal
Advisor to the U.N. Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Joanne
Kalas is a Pace Law School 2010 J.D. candidate who was a member of the
Marshall Island COP-15 delegation. Shakeel Kazmi, esq., Pace Law School
S.J.D. candidate and Adjunct Professor for the Polytechnic Institute of New
York University was a delegate to COP15 on behalf of Pakistan. Saleem Ali is
an Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at the University of Vermont
and attended COP-15 as a delegate for the Party Center for the Study of the
Longer Range Future.
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Prof. Nicholas Robinson: Thank you very much and
welcome to you all. I would like to invite our panel to come up
because I am really going to be the hors d’oeuvres before the main
course; and being a lawyer as well as an academic, I know that I
am not going to have enough time to say anything. So, I have
written out some remarks in a short essay and am incorporating
them by reference, so you will not have to hear me deliver those
remarks. I am pleased to say that the Pace Environmental Law
Review is going to publish the proceedings of this event, and you
can read the extended version of those remarks in due course.
But this round table, which I will ask Jamie Van Nostrand to
moderate and introduce, is one of the most important we have
had here at the Law School because the stakes for climate change
are extraordinary.
A good lawyer knows not to stand between you and the
stories that are going to be told of Copenhagen and what
happened there. But, I want to give you a little background, a
little perspective on this moment, which seems so crucial to us
and perhaps disappointing to some, but it is part of a long march,
a march that has been going on a long time. Copenhagen was the
most contentious and I think the most difficult multilateral
environmental negotiation I have ever seen in the forty some-odd
years we have been having these negotiations. That, however,
does not mean we are in trouble; it means we are going to have to
work harder—but we knew we were going to have work harder—
and I want to give you some perspective on why this is so.
First, as you will here, there are different perspectives about
what happened, and each of you has your own perspective, and
each of these perspectives is probably somewhat correct because
we do not agree on what to do about climate change, nor do the
nations of the world agree on what to do about climate change. In
1992 at the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, the Earth Summit at Rio, we had a global
consensus on what to do about many environmental problems
including climate change. That global consensus has eroded with
respect to the climate. In 1992 at Rio, we were able to achieve a
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change through two
very vigorous years of tough negotiations. We were also able to
agree upon and sign a convention on biological diversity to cope
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with the fact that we are in the middle of the great era of humaninduced extinction of other species.
We were able to bring about these great events because we
had built a foundation with Agenda 21, an 800-page blueprint for
how the world should cooperate together to solve environmental
problems. It did not take two years alone to negotiate Agenda 21
or the other two treaties. For the four years prior to Rio, there
had been a series of international meetings to try and reach a
consensus about these steps. Those meetings were based on a
three year process which James McNeil, a great Canadian who
we honored here a couple of years ago, had put together for Mme.
Grohar Brundtlandt, then prime minister of Norway and Chair of
the World Commission on Environment and Development. This
produced a book in 1987 entitled Our Common Future.
Our Common Future is still in print by Oxford University
Press and you should buy it if you have the chance. It is the
blueprint for all of the multilateral diplomacy that has come
since, and it has all of two paragraphs on climate change in which
it states, rather starkly, that this is a big problem, and we have to
solve it. The rest of the book talks about all of the other problems
that are, in many ways just as bad as climate change. What that
book did for the foreign ministries of the world was to get them
all reading from the same page. They began to work together.
The book made the case for why the scientific community had to
do a better job marshalling the evidence about climate change as
a very complex problem.
We did not have much knowledge about our climate until we
had satellites to study the climate; until we had a system of
supercomputers that could model different variations as to what
was happening to the climate; until our marine scientists could
tell us how the climate was really part of the oceans and the
oceans part of the climate. In fact, we are all part of the
hydrologic cycle if you look at the fact that most of you and me is
water. We have a very new understanding about the climate. It
was not a historical understanding; we had to build it. So, in
1988, as a result of Our Common Future, the U.N. Environment
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization created
and convened the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPPC). One year after Our Common Future was published, the
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IPCC began its assessment reports. It has done four of them so
far and is now into plans for the fifth.
These assessment reports were hugely successful in
gathering a consensus for the climate change framework. But
they also created the seeds of their own problems by making us
afraid and, for the first time, showing the nations of the world a
mirror in which they could see their future and the trends that
their future portended. It was not a happy picture. Small island
states, for whom our law school has been much devoted over the
last several years through our Environmental Diplomacy course,
face the existential crisis of losing much of their territory, much
of their culture, much of their tradition, and much of their people.
The deltas of Bangladesh and New Orleans and the other great
Mississippi delta communities are threatened by climate change
with sea level rise. The glaciers and the ecology of the alpine
environment are at risk of changing. All of this has frightened
nations but has done one thing more than that: it has caused
almost a knee jerk reaction of “I’m alright, we haven’t really got
this problem, so let’s think about it a little more before we act.”
The developing countries, including China and India, have a
huge population growth that wants to live like you and me. They
want social economic development and I think the best analogy I
can give you is to go back to James Fenimore Cooper. How many
of you have read The Prairie? You probably had to read it in high
school. I recommend you go back and re-read it. James Fenimore
Cooper lived right here in Westchester—in Rye, and was one of
our great New York authors. In The Prairie, his protagonist,
Natty Bumppo, laments that all these people, these immigrants
are coming from the East coast and moving into the high-grass
prairie and, boy, are they mucking it up, ruining the ecology of
the prairie. They are destroying the range of the species and
portending what we did to the buffalo in exterminating most of
them and, of course, the genocide we committed against the
indigenous people on this continent as we all moved west from
the east. That was manifest destiny, and you can read all about
manifest destiny as a political movement in North America. And
it is the manifest destiny of India and China and many other
parts of the world to be like you and me in the United States of
America. And it is not going to stop.
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Some time ago, in my preparation of this book, which I am
pleased to say the climate change course in this school and others
around the United States are now using, I came to the conclusion
that we had passed the tipping point on climate change. We are
in a new world, friends. It is not the world we all were born into,
although it was happening at that time, too. We are over the
tipping point. We are in a period in which we must make sense of
how to adapt to a climate-changed world in which nothing we
grew up with is going to be the same. The sooner we wrap our
minds around the changes we must make to cope with this new
system, the sooner we will cope with it. And cope with it we can;
and cope with it we must.
Climate change does not mean the end of life on earth but the
dire prescriptions that some would put forward I think have to be
taken soberly. I am most distressed that my great grandchildren,
and perhaps my grandchildren, will probably never see the
glaciers of Glacier National Park, although I am going to get
them there as fast as I can. They are almost gone, and are
moving fast. There will be places where we must proactively
develop entire new disciplines like coastal morphology to reshape
our coastlines, to plan new harbors, to move infrastructure
inland, to build new wetlands and mangroves in ways that can
sustain our biological systems, and to help rather more static
things like coral to continue their evolutionary path.
We, in universities, are going to have to take up the
leadership in thinking this all through. There are three phases, if
we look at the negotiations, that have to happen in the postCopenhagen world that I think we have to confront, and I have
laid them all out in essay. The first is, in the next three to seven
years nothing much is going to happen out of the U.N.
Framework on Climate Change. The G-77 would not even let the
legal working group meet during a two week period. There is no
consensus on how to proceed. So, in the next three to seven years
we need to do as much as we can with every decision our society
must make to adapt to climate change and to work on the
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.
This is why we
developed a Masters of Climate Change Law here at the law
school, to tool up to do those things. Ultimately, this will create a
track of successful ventures to basically make the new systems
we need in order to cope with a new climate affected world.
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Taking these steps to adapt to climate change will also allow
us to rebuild confidence.
You cannot have international
negotiations without competence amongst the players. During
that time we are going to have to work with the International
Renewable Energy Agency to create the first distributed energy
systems in the developing world to bring rural electrification to
most of Africa and many other parts of the world. If we do that,
we will show that we are investing in the lives and careers of
millions of people just as a former president of this country,
Lyndon Baines Johnson did when he brought rural electrification
to Texas and the south and basically created a political movement
with consensus that carried him all the way to the White House.
We need to work with those who need rural electrification and
distributed energy; and not on the basis of a fossil fuel system.
That can happen as we move into the second phase.
The second phase is where we will have rebuilt confidence in
international cooperation. We have that confidence in the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of Stratospheric Ozone and the
Montreal Protocol. You will not find the Copenhagen stories you
are about to hear told today in the Montreal Protocol system
because we cooperated there. In Montreal we did a great job, as
we have done more to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions under
the Montreal Protocol than under any other measure. It has
eliminated chlorofluorocarbons that are 20,000 times, each CFC,
more potent as a greenhouse gas than one CO2 molecule.
So, we can build confidence off of these other systems and
finally off of what René Dubos told all of us who went to the
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment back in 1972:
“think globally, act locally.” All of our measures locally must
accumulate toward adaptation and mitigation. If we do that, we
will go into the third phase, which is the phase of climate change
management and stewardship. And with those thoughts, I am
going to pass the baton over to Jamie Van Nostrand to give you a
sense of what happened in Copenhagen, and discuss why the
confidence we needed to move ahead eroded so starkly and so
dramatically. Jamie is the director of our Center for Climate and
Energy Law and we are very pleased to have him here at Pace in
that capacity.
Prof. Jamie Van Nostrand: Thank you Professor Robinson.
I want to reserve as much time as we can for questions so what I
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thought we would do to kick this off is to just have each of our
panelist introduce themselves, a little bit of background, how
they happened to be there [at the COP], and sort of handle that
pretty quickly so that we can reserve as much time as we can for
questions.
So just starting down the panel here with Mr. Revkin.
Mr. Andrew Revkin: Well, I was there and I have been
writing about climate since before there was an IPCC and Kyoto
Convention, since the mid-1980s, and for me this was just the
latest ride on the great carousel of climate diplomacy. I was there
from the very beginning to the very end—two full weeks—trying
to make sense of this for the New York Times, for my blog, and
for the printed page. It was exhausting and puzzling and
discouraging and fascinating, and I’ll leave it at that. That gives
you a sense of why I was there.
Mr. Saleem Ali: I am Saleem Ali, and I am a professor at the
University of Vermont, I was there as a delegate for the Party
Center for the Study of the Longer Range Future, which is a
think-tank based at Boston University and I plan to be doing
some writing on conflicts over climate change. So my goal was
not just to go to the Bella Center, which was the place where the
main United Nations meetings were being held, but also to go to
the various other forums around Copenhagen, which were taking
place at the time. Most notably the Shadow Forum, which was
being organized by activists, which was also a very vital and
chaotic place. There was also an industry forum going on called
Bright Green, and that was a fascinating showcase of technology
and so my goal was to try to really understand the landscape of
conflict, the epistemic conflict over climate change as they were
being articulated. I was also there to observe the side events
within the Bella Center as they pertain to environmental
education. What was really impressive to me this time, having
been to several of the conventions of the parties and other areas
for biodiversity, was the number of students participating.
Because we are in a center of higher learning here, there were
unprecedented numbers of students from higher education
institutions there and that was very refreshing—informed
students, not just the ones who tie themselves to doors, but the
ones who are really interested in collective learning.
Van Nostrand: Dean Ottinger
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Dean Emeritus Richard Ottinger: I am Dick Ottinger and I
am Dean Emeritus at the Law School, I was a former dean here.
I went to Copenhagen representing Pace. I head the energy and
climate group of the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) and I represented them. Their prime focus is on
forest preservation, REDD, and what they called environmentally
based adaptation. And I was there also as a part of the
Environmental Grant Makers’ Association delegation, a group of
U.S. foundations that spend a great deal of money to try to make
things happen in the climate area.
I attended all the plenary sessions during the first week until
NGO access was limited by the Convention and after that I was
at Environmental Grant Makers’ briefings with many of the key
negotiators. I also went to many side events. It was incredible;
there were a thousand NGOs there and almost all of them gave
high-level presentations. And there was just a huge amount of
knowledge presented; you could take a complete course in climate
change from what went on there.
I do not agree with Nick, that there was not a consensus
about what we need to do about climate change. I sat through
the plenary sessions and heard speaker after speaker insist that
we had to reduce our emissions of greenhouse gases and that we
have to at least hold down temperature increases to 2%—
450ppm. They were not in agreement on who ought to do what
and how much each country ought to contribute, but I felt that
they laid the foundation for being able to go forward, and I think
Nick’s optimism that this can be done, is true.
We did a lot of work with AOSIS small island states and the
most vulnerable Least Developed Countries in preparing for the
conference. In past conferences they have gone hat in hand to
U.N. conferences and said, “Please help us.” This time they flexed
their muscles. They actually represent a majority of the votes—if
you had a vote at the conference—and they actually shut the
conference down for an entire week, insisting that their needs be
attended to. They were also successful in getting commitments
for short-term adaptation assistance of $30 billion through 2012
and $100 billion a year starting in 2020, though the donors to this
fund were not specified. For the first time these most vulnerable
parties are to be taken into account.
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The other remarkable accomplishment, from my standpoint,
and I have been to many of these U.N. conferences, is that in the
past, certain emerging nations declined to participate in the
Kyoto Protocol because they said that the developed countries
were responsible for the build up of greenhouse gasses in their
industrialization; they got rich using fossil fuels, they ought to be
the ones to at least lead the way in resolving the problems. At
this conference, they fully participated and although China and
the United States had a good many conflicts along the way, they
ended up as the leaders in negotiating the Copenhagen Accord.
The emerging countries also all made emission reduction
commitments, including Brazil, South Africa, India and China,
who formed a new BASIC organization, and Mexico that agreed
to host the next COP-16 conference. These are the countries that
are expected to account for the greatest increase in emissions
over the next decade.
I know that some of our European colleagues, who have been
leaders in this field, felt that the Copenhagen conference was a
great failure. It was a failure only in that no binding agreement
was reached.
And the specific commitment for emission
reductions was no where near what the IPCC said was necessary
to avoid catastrophe; but such a final agreement was not expected
in the middle of the worst recession that world has seen. It was
known well in advance of the conference that a final agreement
with commitments was not going to be feasible at this conference.
A lot of really important agreements happened in Copenhagen; a
lot of really important progress was made that laid the
groundwork for reaching an agreement in due course.
Van Nostrand: Caleb, you want to introduce yourself and
why you were there?
Mr. Caleb Christopher: Sure, I am Caleb Christopher. I am
a 2007 graduate of Pace Law School, and since that time and, in
fact, during part of my third year of law school, I served as a legal
advisor to the U.N. Mission of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands down in New York. I worked on a broad range of issues
but worked most closely with issues related to sustainable
development, fisheries, and climate change. And I have been part
of the Marshall Islands UNFCCC negotiating team for the past
year and a half or so. So, I was not only at Copenhagen in that
capacity but, at a full series of grueling meetings leading up to it

9

COP15_PANEL_FINAL_3

632

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

over the past year or so. And I thought that, or imagined that,
after Copenhagen I would at least have a little bit of a breather or
rest, and to some extent that was true, although many if the
issues have sort of followed me back here and are still very much
active.
The Republic of the Marshall Islands is a low-lying small
island developing state, an atoll nation of 1,000 small islands
within 29 coral atolls, spread out over a little more than half a
million square kilometers of sea and an even larger exclusive
economic zone. So it is, for being a small nation, also a large
ocean nation, if you wanted to think about it not just as a very
scarce amount of land, but a large amount of ocean. But the very
scarce amount of land is important to the Marshalls. I should
probably preface, as similar to most of those that are appearing
before the law school, I am appearing in a personal capacity, and
my personal opinion may or may not reflect those of the client
that I work for. But certainly, to go back to some public
statements that some of the political missions made at the
meeting and during the closing hours . . . it is the countries
which may have the most to lose in this process; that is, not only
the long-term development, but their short-term security and
statehood is at stake. So it is a little bit of a double-edged sword
in not benefiting from a lack of an agreement, but also not
benefiting from an inadequate agreement—and that makes
decision making very complex.
For being a small, and to some extent geographically remote
nation, the Marshall Islands has often found itself in the middle
of world affairs in its history as a U.N. trust territory and as an
independent nation which holds a political compact with the US.
Most people have heard of the term bikini as swimwear, but [the
term] actually refers to the Bikini Atoll which is one of the places
where an extensive amount of nuclear weapons testing took place
shortly after World War II. That was an event which has sort of
gone through the decades and generations as one that signs as a
moving target, and really kind of put the nation into an inter-play
of international agreements, which may be well intentioned, but
in some sense lacked throughout the years. There is also the
notion that some impacts and some losses could be compensated.
I often refer back to my first year of law school, and I think of
these issues—the way many cultures or countries think about
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land is one that is an interchangeable resource, something that
can be bought and sold. But in the Marshall Islands, land is still
held through customary land tenures. It is still held through
[someone] that we understand as a chief or a leader, who in some
sense is responsible for a larger community of people. So, the
climate change process has really been interesting and at times, a
very difficult interplay of different interpretations and notions of
what defines a country, what defines a state, and what one’s
relation to the land is. So, it also defines the nation again as it
was during World War II and during the nuclear testing, as being
very much at the center of a larger global discussion. And it is a
developing nation, so it has very complex economic and social
development issues and it also shares many issues with other
small island states. As Dean Ottinger mentioned, AOSIS (the
Alliance of Small Island States—a group of forty-three members
of thirty-six U.N. member states—traditionally works together as
a negotiation block within the United Nations. This is the group
that I work with on legal issues in particular. And so my lens or
perspective during the Copenhagen meeting was very much
through them.
Jamie Van Nostrand: Shakeel.
Mr. Shakeel Kazmi: Hi, I am Shakeel Kazmi as most of you
know I am an S.J.D. candidate at Pace and at the same time I am
teaching a global marketing course. I also practice in New York.
I attended Copenhagen as a delegate member of Pakistan’s
government and fortunately or unfortunately, I was the only one
with a legal background. So, I really had a good time there,
although it was very hectic but very educational also. I had the
opportunity to advise Pakistan’s Environmental Minister and I
helped the Foreign Minister to prepare his speech. At the same
time, I had the opportunity to meet with the Minister of Pakistan
and other developing countries. I also had the opportunity to
speak to the President for ten minutes, a very eclectic person. He
gave me five minutes, but in five minutes we exchanged only two
or three words because of translation problems.
Overall, it was a fruitful experience because I learned the
meaning of “national interest.” Everybody was talking about
their national interest, and I had the opportunity to ask quite a
few of the delegates privately what exactly that means, for their
nations’ interest. Because on the one hand they claim that their
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nation in the future will not exist and on the other hand they are
so concerned about their future interests, this nation that may
not exist in the future.
Anyhow, because it was a good
experience, I recommend all of you if you do get an opportunity
you should attend a meeting like this. My opinion is that it is at
least two semesters of education.
Jamie Van Nostrand: Joanne, if you could identify yourself
and tell us why you were there.
Ms. Joanne Kalas: I am Joanne Kalas and I am a third year
student here at Pace. My involvement in COP-15 was that I took
the U.N. diplomacy course here at Pace, starting in the spring of
2009. So I first worked with AELCO and then over the summer I
worked on some climate change issues with IUCN working with
Dean Ottinger and also Professor Van Nostrand and Professor
Robinson. And then this past fall, I was able to have the great
opportunity to work with Caleb Christopher in helping them
prepare for COP-15. So I had the interest, and sort of just
expressed my interest to go, and there was an opportunity for me
to attend the conference and due to the small size of the staff
Caleb was very excited for me to be able to help in any way I
could. So it just seemed that all the stars aligned, my finals just
seemed to fall into place that I could attend the second week of
the conference. So I was there for the whole second week and my
perspective, my goal, was really to help Caleb and to attend
different sessions because he obviously could not be everywhere
at once. There were a lot of different negotiating sessions going
on at the same time. Some of them were simultaneous to
different plenary sessions that were going on so I went to
different sessions, I took notes, I met with different delegations
and spoke with them, I also helped Caleb arrange for some high
level meetings with the Head of State of the Marshall Islands,
with various individuals that were there, including Senators,
Congressmen, with Secretary Clinton and the Department of
Commerce. So my perspective was really assisting him, but also
as a student who just felt very fortunate to be able to take in the
experience and to build on everything from Professor Robinson’s
U.N. Diplomacy course that I had learned and just to take in as
much as I could and to speak to people in Copenhagen and speak
to the other delegates to try and get a first hand perspective of
their positions at the conference.
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Van Nostrand: Thanks. We heard a little bit from Dean
Ottinger about what he saw as some of the accomplishments at
Copenhagen. I wonder if we could have each of the panelists
address what they view as the most significant accomplishments
coming out of Copenhagen and maybe the reverse side of that:
what are the most significant failures or disappointments from
Copenhagen. We’ll start with you Mr. Revkin.
Revkin: For me the biggest accomplishments were the things
that were aligned before the meeting even happened, the
commitments that were laid down in anticipation of the meeting
by the countries that, as you heard earlier, had not previously put
anything on paper even in a tentative way, in terms of a
departure from a business as usual on emissions. And that is
really the end in my sense. As a journalist looking at the outcome
and in thinking ahead to Mexico City, I know there will be some
kind of agreement coming out in December, but some of the
stresses that were on display in Copenhagen my sense is that if I
am the atmosphere looking down at all this I am not going to see
anything in Mexico come out that would relieve me from the
standpoint of the place where all those emissions are
accumulating. It is one thing to get an agreement—we need
something binding in some way. But it is another to see whether
it will have a visible impact on emissions. So many times, you
just heard the key word the “national interest,” and you heard
probably, if you follow this day by day, an urging of the nation’s
leaders to think globally even though they are elected locally, or
essentially beholden to—even if they are not a democracy—as
they serve local interests. But how many do that? In a real world
where, as you look at what happened among the different
interests at Copenhagen, there were many countries that came
there with completely different senses of what the climate
problem is.
This reminds me of someone I have become friendly with over
recent years, Ted Kheel, who tries to break down a negotiation
into these sort-of basic components. The problem with this
“problem,” is that everyone is coming to the table with a different
set of goals and from utterly different arenas—for one it is
compensation for adaptation costs, for another it is how to get
credit for emissions reductions that might happen anyway,
basically how to cheat. And so they all come in the room, and
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again you will see a series of negotiations this year and
something happening in December, but watching from the
outside as a journalist, I try really hard to take on the role of the
atmosphere—it is become this kind of mental game for me as a
way to keep track of what is really meaningful and not
meaningful, and by the way the last thing we saw in Copenhagen
was as you heard a thousand NGOs were there but some of the
key things that were not being discussed were fundamental parts
of this problem: innovation. How do you drive the innovation that
will be necessary to de-carbonize a growing global energy menu?
That was really not part of anyone’s activist agenda. There were
vegans there, and that’s great, you know, if we all ate a vegan
diet, the emissions we face would probably be lower. But again
you see a world heading toward 9 billion people, more or less,
with appetites, and as we get wealthier we have larger appetites.
Those issues—how do you provide energy for that growing
population—were not really there and that is what bothers me.
All those things will probably be there in some capacity in Mexico
City—I can’t wait. But I will be there with a big giant, skeptical
kind of radar on.
Ali: In terms of the accomplishments, I think that the role of
the summit was really to have constructive confrontation. From
a conflict resolution perspective, I think confrontation can be both
positive and negative. If it is negative, it is likely to just lead
people back to where they came from, they do not have any
crossover of information, and they do not really come out of their
entrenched positions. And I do not feel that there was a shift in
those entrenched positions from that constructive confrontation.
So, for example, I met with people from the World Bank with
whom I had worked previously on issues related to the extractive
industries, which was one of my main areas of research, who did
not believe in climate change at all six, seven years ago; they
would laugh at me and ridicule me, and now the World Bank was
forcing them to take courses on climate change. There they were
attending science events and trying to understand atmospheric
chemistry and so on. So I think that was all very positive. There
was still a friction of course.
The issue of inequality was center stage. I have a very
developmental lens on environmental issues, and I am glad that
the developing countries throw tantrums about these issues
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because that is the way by which the developed countries are
going to try and at least listen to them—perhaps. But the thing
which I found problematic, was that there was also a lot of the old
colonial narrative being played again. There was obstructionism
at the behest of that narrative, also by the developing countries.
So I felt that, in many ways, this was a coming of age for the
developing world. They were able to assert themselves. But at
the same time I felt them being too anchored in the past at times
in the kinds of material that was being circulated and so on. And
certainly the role of China in that regard was also problematic.
And, that this was a real opportunity for China to shine through
and say, “We’re going to break from the past, we’re going to
embrace pluralism,” in various ways. And, sadly that was a
missed opportunity and I will blame the U.S. for that partly,
because the U.S. sent wrong signals to China on that. When
Secretary of State Clinton went to China earlier last year, she
used climate change ironically as an excuse for trumping human
rights, which I found was absolutely shocking, you know. And I
wrote a little op-ed about it at the time because I was just
perplexed that here we are and often, we are linking
environmental issues with human rights, and environmental
issues were being used to trump human rights. Saying, “well, we
have more important things to worry about right now, like
climate change.” So I think the U.S. has to share the blame for
that, kind of missed opportunity as well.
Ottinger: Well, the attempted negotiation of the country
ministries during the first half of the conference was singularly
unsuccessful. But I think we have an entirely different new
world order now in the United Nations system. Usually the
United Nations conferences are totally developed in advance. The
country representatives usually come there with pre-prepared
position papers and they read them. The conference decisions are
made by the major countries, in closed sessions, in advance. But
uniquely, at this conference, the key decisions were made by the
heads of state themselves at the end of the conference.
The AOSIS organization of small island states and Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) made a significant impact on the
conference. They maintained that they need stronger action on
emission reductions than proposed by the IPCC and they
demanded stronger action by the U.S. to give them hope that they
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would be able to survive the catastrophic effects of climate change
predicted by the IPCC. The fact that they made themselves felt
from a moral standpoint, that the world had an obligation to see
that they weren’t wiped out, I thought was very encouraging, and
the fact that they walked out at one point to emphasize the
importance of addressing their needs was important. At past
conferences we had the G-77, an organization of developing
countries in which AOSIS and the LDCs are members, but also
the OPED countries, expressing often very negative views about
reaching international environmental agreements. Here, the
AOSIS and LDC countries by-passed the G-77 and played a key
role in reaching the agreement. They succeeded in getting a
commitment that developed countries would contribute $30
billion short term funding 2010-2012 and $100 billion annually by
2020 to meet their needs, and that’s very important.
Then there was an organization formed called BASIC which
is the emerging countries of Brazil, South Africa, India and China
(also undermining the G-77) that came together and played a key
role in the negotiations and for the first time made commitments
towards emission reduction.
So these developing countries
influenced the outcome in a very meaningful way. You no longer
had Europe, the United States and other large developed
countries sitting in the back room and making the conference
decisions. While many developing countries objected to the closed
process by which the final Accord was drafted by just the BASIC
countries and the U.S. and then approved by twenty-eight
country heads of state, the process was much broader than ever
before.
You cannot expect the countries without resources, dealing
with the extinction of their entire populations, and anticipating
mass global migration, to have the same perspectives as the
European Union, the United States, or even as China, Brazil,
South Africa and India. There is going to have to be an
accommodation between the developed and emerging countries
and the vulnerable developing countries and the negotiations for
the Copenhagen Accord achieved that result.
The most disappointing part of this was the failure to reach
an agreement among the participants about an allocation of
emission reduction and financing obligations. The Accord did
recognize the IPCC goal of emission reductions to limit increases
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to 450ppm and a temperature increase of 2° C. The developing
countries did succeed in getting an obligation to consider a more
stringent reduction to 350 ppm and 1.5° C in the 2015 first review
period—the reductions the IPCC scientists now feel necessary
with the acceleration of global warming.
I saw a coming together of a common objective in knowing
that we have to reduce emissions in order to be able to avoid
catastrophic consequences and the general agreement that
climate change is the most serious problem the world has ever
faced and we’re going to have to address it by figuring out the
allocation of responsibility. Making that happen is going to be
very difficult; we are talking about a lot of money to be raised in a
time of unprecedented global recession.
Sir Nicholas Stern reminds us that the costs of not acting are
far greater than the costs of acting. As we see droughts in Africa,
as we see flooding, as we see more severe storms, as we see water
shortages, as we see food shortages, it becomes clear that climate
change consequences are not something that is far away. This is
something that’s going to affect everybody on earth. As those
consequences become more apparent, I think that the world is
going to come together and the framework of the Copenhagen
Accord lays the foundation for doing that.
The failure to reach a binding agreement on the Accord at the
COP rather than its just “noting” the Accord is largely the
responsibility of the weak leadership of the Danish Prime
Minister who took the Chair of the COP in mid-stream. He said,
“I don’t know what consensus means” and he finally decided that
consensus meant unanimity. Of the 193 countries represented
only five objected to adopting the Accord. He could have
interpreted this as consensus and obtained agreement on its
adoption.
There has been much debate on the legal status of noting the
Accord, some experts believing that it has the standing of soft
law. But at any rate, the formality of having a “binding”
agreement is over-rated. Many formal agreements are not
observed by countries who feel that it is not in their interest to do
so and agreements that do not have treaty status are observed by
countries that do support them. In this case, provision was made
for countries to adopt the Accord and make commitments after
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the Conference and some ninety-seven countries have done so to
date including all the major emitting countries.
Christopher: Very briefly, if I were to reflect on sort of the
more positive outcomes, I think that the amount of attention, the
personal engagement of politicians and many heads of state was
quite important. The point of view was that this was a failure
were some aspects of it failed but it certainly wasn’t for neglect
and I think that that will do well to keep climate change not only
within the international agenda but also in a way that it is
interconnected. You really see the importance of at least a partial
breakthrough in what the times felt almost the cold war divide
between developed and developing countries and while those
distinctions are still evident and still preserved you also saw
states carved out in a way that reflects some very specific action
which could be taken by all or at least a broader number of
countries and I think that also led to some new groupings
emerging—things that are overlapping with the multiple
groupings and all that little chaotic and confusing—I think that
that kind of more complex involvement really helps to facilitate
reaching across the table going forward, so it wasn’t just the G-77
but that breaks down into some groups that have been latent but
now a little are more specific: the voice of vulnerable countries,
voice of large developing countries.
If I were to think about some of the minuses or the negative
aspects I would see that in part the needs of facilitation or
organization, the technical negotiations, the ad hoc working
groups, in many times weren’t really negotiations at all but
simply a cyclical or almost endless process of negotiators stating
and repeating very specific, and those being captured in a series
of cherished documents that would grow or shrink in size and you
never really saw people trying to really internalize what was
being said at the other side of the table. We really do not have a
clear direction as to the ultimate legal form the next steps and
that causes a lot of uncertainty.
I think what we’re left with is a process that is very
constructive the legacy of the mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol is
really not well known but we’re also seeing something that if this
is not just an interim agreement but in some sense a form of what
we’re left with for at least the immediate future it is a progressive
kind of international law or agreement something that is based
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on norms and principles and not commitments and for very
vulnerable countries that doesn’t really provide a lot of assurance.
There are huge risks going forward and very little time, in which
to address those, it is not a lot to hang your hat on, but it is
oriented to protect and all the words on paper are not really as
important as actually seeing the implementation and the actions
which help to affect the fundamental global shift in energy
markets are ultimately going to be more important than formal
agreements.
Van Nostrand: Do you have any thoughts on major
accomplishments?
Kazmi: Yes, I think the result from Copenhagen was
expected especially after our President Obama’s speech; but there
are good things that came out. For example, the comments from
the G-77 in the first meeting, countries that were literally they
fighting with each other but at the end they were sitting at the
same table.
On the other hand, I saw that there was a big, discussion and
many fights over commas, and full stops and brackets. But at
least in end most countries would agree on certain commas and
brackets and now even countries like Pakistan and India which
they, you know, don’t talk to each other but on climate change
that is very encouraging that Pakistan’s environmental minister
and India’s environmental minister they are meeting and they
agree on most of the issues so that the good part I think that in
Mexico.
Kalas: My perspective was more in helping the other
delegates so as a student and as someone who is interested in the
international perspective and international awareness of what
was going on, I saw so many individuals who came not as
delegates and not as individuals participating in the Bella Center
just come to show their support. The first day that I showed up I
was standing outside for about four or five hours in the line to get
a badge, so in that line I met individuals who had biked their way
from London. The oldest person in their group was seventy-two
years old and they came to show their support for climate change.
I met scientists and a [mayor] from Nigeria who was coming to
find out how he could mitigate issues in his particular area.
I just saw an outpouring of public support that I think was a
real accomplishment to the Copenhagen campaign; I saw banners
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all over Copenhagen, I thought that was very inspirational and
also during one of the planning sessions Ban Ki Moon came up
and spoke and he said that he was so impressed with the meeting
because never in his experience in the U.N. has he seen so many
heads of state and high level ministers not only present, but
participating in the negotiations and he has never seen that in
his entire career at the U.N. and it was on climate change and I
think that that was a major accomplishment.
Van Nostrand: Many of us here in the room are taking
courses that will be affected by whether or not there is any
climate legislation in the United States. We have at Pace
Professor Siegel teaching a climate change course and Professor
Troy teaching a clean air act course. I want to know if one of the
panelists wants to weigh in on what they see the implications
coming from Copenhagen on the prospects for climate change
legislation in the United States.
Revkin: I do not see any bright lights for climate change
legislation happening any time soon. I think the sooner this rule
focusing on the energy component of legislation is of getting
agreement, then perhaps a sectoral agreement on our generation
of the utility sector, we might have some kind of prospect of a cap
and trade system; but just in itself, just recently they have
deepened the polarization over the climate gate issue and what I
just writing about the past few days, the “glacier gate” as some
are trying to call it.
There is just enough of those threads out there to give
opponents of any action a solid base of about 20% of Americans.
Recently, I was in a meeting with one of Senator Lugar’s key
advisors on the issues and Lugar is very moderate and
progressive on many issues of diplomacy but the way he was
describing their average Indiana constituent was essentially that
these were not just in Indiana—but they represented a
significant chunk of Americans who are just totally disengaged on
the issue at best and are repelled at worst, so I just don’t see the
prospects there unless there is a real effort to split off the things
where you can get a lot of agreement than where it is not driven
as a climate instrument, but is about an energy efficiency,
innovation technology, and climate benefits.
Van Nostrand: Anyone else want to address that?
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Ali: Yes, again, indirectly I think there will be some
prospects, but not directly. In my case, my interest has been on
the issue of coal mining, and especially what is called mountain
top removal mining, which is caused indirectly and has a major
impact on climate change and there is momentum towards
legislation on that. And that could be a big deal of course in the
United States. I do not think you are going to get rid of all power
plants straight away by any means, but if there can be
momentum towards some transition to other sources by putting
pressure on this kind of mining, then that may be something.
Ottinger: I think that the legislation in this Congress will be
very difficult to pass in the U.S. Senate. The one source of hope
for getting some kind of climate bill through is the actions being
taken by the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate
greenhouse gases. Most Members of Congress would far prefer
legislation to administrative action. The other factor promoting
legislation is the momentous push in the U.S. states towards the
development and implementation of renewable energy and the
adoption of renewable energy standards. There was a provision
included in the Accord for a mechanism for transfer of technology
to developing countries. That always has been a very difficult
topic in the past because of intellectual property complications.
In the United States, you’re seeing a tremendous push to change
our energy patterns by the federal government and the states and
to assist developing countries in adopting clean energy
technologies.
Christopher: Conversations about this issue are very much
on everybody’s mind at the U.N., including U.S. representatives.
But while I cannot speak for them, in some sense, we do know
that climate change in and of itself may not be a top-ten domestic
priority as far as polls to the populace go but you do see the
political commitment at the highest levels and I think that should
not be disregarded. I do not know that the U.S. President
necessarily even anticipated when he was coming over, but there
is a certain amount of political, or rather personal investment in
that. You may see, in the near term, making a partial package at
best in terms of legislation, something that may focus on
providing evidence and means to grow the energy sector. I think
it is also going to be important to start to shed a little bit more
light on something like the neglected story that is capturing the

21

COP15_PANEL_FINAL_3

644

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

statements that have been taken through both regions and
individual states within the United States. California and New
York State are two very important examples of that. Looking at
how some states have interpreted or reinterpreted their
environmental impact assessment laws. I am going with NEPA,
the National Environmental Policy Act—each are all smaller
pieces of the puzzle, but it is important to remember that a whole
picture is still a puzzle composed of small pieces. So very much
like Copenhagen, you may not see one U.S. domestic legislative
package that solves everything in one breath, but that does not
mean that we should lose sight of the smaller pieces.
Van Nostrand: We heard some mention of China playing a,
sort of, singularly unhelpful role in Copenhagen. I am wondering
if the panelists have thoughts on what were the other significant
impediments to having achieving a binding agreement on
greenhouse gases.
Revkin: The U.S. Senate—sixty-seven votes. Find sixtyseven votes to grab for a round of viable instruments and show
them to me and I’ll buy you a nice dinner.
Ottinger: Well we have been doing a lot of work with China,
and China is taking the environment very seriously at this point.
It is the leader in solar and thermal applications of the world. It
has two million people with solar hot water heaters. China is the
leader today in production of wind power machines. It aspires to
be the leader in electric vehicles and it has a very aggressive
energy efficiency program. So, just as in the United States, you
are seeing a lot of actions to reduce pollution and therefore, in the
process, reducing the greenhouse gas emissions.
Ali: Just to clarify, I also feel that China is doing a lot of
positive things, but my bottom line and going back to that point
is, until there is still that issue of pluralism and human rights
does not address, we cannot decouple the environment. Chinese
civil society just does not have a major presence at COP-15 as
much as the other countries for a very simple reason. Again,
going back to that issue, you cannot keep pressure on the
government in terms of introspection and seeing what policies are
right and wrong. You will end up with potentially some major
planning disasters like the Three Waters Dam which maybe
ostensibly could be good for climate change but is otherwise a
fiasco which the government is itself realizing now and was
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pitching it initially as a solution to climate change. So you need,
it is very important to not decouple those issues for that reason
and absolutely there are a lot of positive things going on in China,
but I think the U.S. would be misguided to take the pressure off
human rights on just that part.
Kalas: Regarding impediments that I saw, I felt like there
was, in general, a lot of political will from some to actually get to
an agreement, but even when individuals were generally willing
to come to an agreement, it seemed that in specifics there was a
disagreement so you could not actually put a number down on
paper. So, for example, one of the sessions that I attended, a
negotiation session, was for the shared vision portion of the text
and to what Jay Godfrey said earlier, it did kind of deviate from
all the other U.N. views on meetings that I attended in the past
where everyone comes with their statement that they have
prepared and they just read them. Instead the chair really just
kind of threw the room on its heads and said “ok, I know you all
have come with statements but I really just want to find out
where you stand on the 350ppm issue and where you stand on the
degree increase. So just give me a number.” And he went around
the room and you saw individuals would just vary in numbers.
So even though people did show a willingness to want to get to
some kind of an agreement, the specifics also seemed to be kind
of, you know, crashing and hooking people.
But I also wanted to go back to something that Caleb had
said regarding domestic legislation here in the United States. I
did feel pressure on the U.S. and maybe it’s because I’m an
American and I was there and I was listening to the comments
people were making, but it seems to me that on the international
level there is a lot of pressure to make climate change an issue
and if you go onto the website for COP-15, I am not sure if they
have the video or the paper statements, but a lot of the
statements mentioned specifically the United States, saying you
cannot hold the world hostage through your domestic legislation.
Whether that is going to translate anything to our Congress,
whether they care, whether they are paying attention, I am not
sure. But certainly as Caleb said, at the highest level, there is
pressure that is there and it’s a lot of individuals who are waiting
for the United States to come up with legislation in order to come
up with a legally binding agreement. If we just do not even have
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that discussion within our Congress indefinitely, I do feel like
people will make us accountable for that on the international
level.
Kazmi: I think that with China, we hear as much [evidence]
as any other country. What I believe, there are two main reasons
that we couldn’t reach agreement. The first one, I thought the
United States was not ready to sign anything else for domestic
reasons. And also I noticed that even the Prime Minister, he also
kind of was hesitant to sign an agreement but the big problem in
China attending all these meetings is that we did not have the
proper leadership in Copenhagen. The way the meetings were
handled, I think they were not proper and if we had a better
President of COP-15, perhaps we would have had different
results. And the secret papers and documents, last minute
commenting, and countries were certainly every day surprised.
For fifteen days at Copenhagen, we were working on brackets and
commas and the question is whether we just wasted time and
then, in the end, our leaders did not have enough time to adopt.
Christopher: You know, to some extent, the negotiations
have been working on these vast brackets and commas since
probably last year and certainly acknowledged that at
intercessional meetings beforehand. And we were always told
this is just the time to submit views, you know, the actual
negotiations aren’t really, you know, occurring in the here and
now. And, in fact they did not until the very end. And they were
not able to occur within the traditional ad hoc working room
forum. Now, you know, on one hand, at the U.N., when decisions
are made, it is a core group of noisy countries that are in a
smaller room and it is not the big, huge hall that most of you see
and know.
On the other hand, it is actually a fairly
representative group of countries that had that discussion. You
know, to get back to the question over China and a lot of
statements that have come out, they are not necessarily
inaccurate, but on the other hand, China clearly wants to play a
destructive role in this process. I think they are also seeking to
assert themselves politically in ways in which they haven’t in the
recent past, and I think that’s very important and just reflective
of some shifting global economics. You know, I wouldn’t really
say, and at the outset we walked in to this calling for a legally
binding agreement, perhaps knowing that it still wouldn’t be on
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the table by all parties, but wanting to show that it was possible,
that it was an issue of political will, and not timing, and we’re
able to produce a draft agreement, which is still out there as a
model, but there may be a lack of appetite by a core group of
nations, not just one, for a legally binding agreement at this point
in time. And, to some extent, you might see that lowering of floor
for everybody, simply to reflect what they would ultimately be
cautious of, in terms of how their own emissions or commitments
are expressed. You know, we’re not taking a top-down approach
right now; it is a bottom-up approach. At least it is an approach
and you’re seeing the bottom occurring, but, you know, in a week
or so when you start to add up all those numbers, I can pretty
much tell you that it will not come anywhere close to hitting the
below two-degrees mark that was agreed upon. So, a lot more
work has to be done going forward, but that really is not going to
occur until we are able to come to, I think, a better process for the
negotiations to occur. So, not just to refer to them collectively but
actually finding a way to capture the discussions that were
outside within broader formats; we cannot just be repeating each
other and talking past each other. And that was not necessarily
just for COP-15 presidents, although they had a large role in that,
but it’s also, to some extent, the institution that I have seen that
of this negotiation forum that has been doing this for twenty
years; negotiators very close to each other and in some sense, this
shook that up a little bit, but more has to be done to shake it up.
Revkin: Just one quick thought . . . forward thinking, I think
there is one big difference in watching this process over the last
couple of decades. Both domestically and internationally, I think
there’s a growing recognition that what began being a pollution
problem, meaning: put a restriction on it, put a price on it, and it
will start to go away, that will solve it. The Clean Air Act is being
recognized increasingly as a technology and sufficiency. We do
not have the energy sources we need to satisfy the appetite of the
growing world. Climate change, and you will see Steve Chu talk
about this, is a big forum on energy and you will see much more
discussion about energy technology transfer, about his wishful
idea of public carbon capture which is utterly wishful, but I do
think you will see increasingly this all shift to be more of a
technology than just pollution [control].
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